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TAX CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
IN OBAMACARE CONTINUED:
NFIB V. SEBELIUS IN LIGHT OF CITIZENS
UNITED V. FEC,
SPEISER V. RANDALL, WINDSOR V. UNITED
STATES, LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, ET AL.
BY: JOHN DOROCAK
INTRODUCTION
Faculty, students, administrators, guests, distinguished fellow
speakers.
I have been asked to address the future of Obamacare in light of my
past scholarship involving NFIB v. Sebelius.1
In the presence of my fellow very distinguished speakers and this
audience, I feel, as I often do, to be something of an interloper. I am merely
the tax professor trying to understand how Obamacare was ever
constitutional. The fact that this presentation was not much altered by the
events concerning the ACA and AHCA likely speaks either to the
timelessness or irrelevance of the topic. I prefer to believe it is the former.
Now retired Professor Erik Jensen, of my J.D. alma mater, Case
Western Reserve University, has said, in an article Critical Theory and the
Loneliness of the Tax Prof, “[T]he issues of race, gender, and class have not
been addressed very much by tax professors, who have instead ‘focused on
more narrow and technical issues in business and financial taxation.’”2

1

567 U.S. 519 (2012).
* John R. Dorocak, Honors A.B., Xavier University, J.D., Case Western Reserve University,
LL.M. (Tax), University of Florida, C.P.A., California and Ohio, is a Professor of Accounting at
California State University, San Bernardino. Thank you to my wife, Tanya, who constantly
inspires me, our new dog Indy, who has taken on the task from the sadly deceased and not
forgotten Murphy to constantly entertain me, and to our sons Jonathan and Garrett, who
constantly interest me. Thank you also to Kathi Menard who has taken on the task, from the now
retired Marion Wiltjer, of trying to decipher my dictation and handwriting. In addition, I would
like to thank participants at the Pacific Southwest Region Academy of Legal Studies in Business
Annual Meetings for their insightful comments and questions concerning this and other
publications of mine.
2

Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof, 76 N.C.L. Rev. 1753, 1756,
& n.17 and accompanying text (1998) (citing Edward McCaffery, Statement at Taxation and the
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Professor Jensen has also stated, “But raise one tax question with a conlaw
person and he’s gone. . . .”3
Still, tax practitioners and tax academicians were forced to deal with
Obamacare as it was first determined to be constitutional as a tax and
subsequently implemented as a tax.
Many may have had a visceral reaction; how can the government
force us to purchase medical insurance? What is next? Eating broccoli as
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in his opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius, seemingly
holding the Commerce Clause could not sustain a federal mandate on
individuals to purchase health insurance?4 Or purchasing life insurance, as I
have sometimes not so facetiously suggested?
Professor Randy Barnett of Georgetown Law School, has suggested,
as I understand, that professors have missed the fact that individuals are not
forced to buy health insurance, but rather to pay a tax if they do not choose
to purchase health insurance.5 Many tax professors might say, what’s the
difference? Professor Barnett was arguing for the no small feat of the antiObamacare litigants at the Supreme Court in NFIB prevailing on the
argument that Obamacare could not be sustained as an extension of the
Commerce Clause.6
In any event, what constitutional arguments are available against
Obamacare to support what I have suggested as the initial constitutional gut
reaction? My first foray into examining the constitutionality of Obamacare
may have been more unique–that liberty was the constitutional right violated
by Obamacare. When I first wrote in New Hampshire Law Review in 2013,
I drew upon Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Lawrence v. Texas, and the
precursors–particularly Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut (“The right to be let alone” protected by, of all things, the Ninth
Amendment) and the language, which some have attributed to Justice
Kennedy in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
(“choices central to personal dignity and autonomy are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).7

Family Conference at Lewis & Clark Northwestern School of Law (Oct. 6, 1995), quoted in
Rebecca S. Rudnick, Taxation and the Family, 69 Tax Notes 421, 421 (1995)).
3
Id. at 1753.
4
567 U.S. 519, 558 (2012).
5
Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law
Professors Miss the Boat)? 65 Fla. L. Rev. 1331, 1337-38 (2013).
6
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
7
John R. Dorocak, Tax Constitutional Questions in “Obamacare”: National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius in Light of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and
Speiser v. Randall: Conditioning a Tax Benefit on the Nonexercise of a Constitutional Right, 11
U. N.H. L. Rev. 189, 200–208 (2013) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
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Subsequent to my publication in New Hampshire’s Law Review,
Justice Kennedy, of course, wrote the majority opinion in United States v.
Windsor revisiting his analysis, ten years after, from Lawrence v. Texas.8
Next, I wrote of Justice Kennedy’s analysis on the unconstitutionality of
DOMA (The Defense of Marriage Act) in GMU Civil Rights Law Journal.9
Thirdly, I asked in Connecticut Public Interest Law Review, Why is
Obamacare constitutional while DOMA was not?10 Certainly, there are other
arguments that legislation such as, and similar to, Obamacare is
unconstitutional. Some have written, as mentioned, of the exceptional
campaign mounted, and the success at the U.S. Supreme Court, in arguing
that Obamacare could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause. Others
have raised additional arguments, which I attempted to summarize in the
Connecticut article, against the constitutionality of Obamacare, including the
following:
1.
the aforementioned lack of Commerce Clause support;
2.
the Origination Clause (that Obamacare legislation
originated in the Senate essentially rather than, as required by the
Constitution, in the House);
3.
the Uniformity Clause (that Obamacare, if it is a tax, is not
uniform throughout the United States, as required by the Constitution);
4.
the direct tax clause (that Obamacare was in violation of the
Constitutional prohibition on direct taxes unless apportioned among the
states); and
5.
the lack of an Enumerated Power for the federal government
to enact such a program.6.
The fact that, despite Chief Justice Roberts’
majority opinion in NFIB, the Obamacare tax is not a tax, at least not a tax
seen before.11
The focus of my comments today will be how legislation, such as
Obamacare, violates liberty or liberty rights conferred by the Constitution.

8

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692-2694 (2013) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003)).
9
John R. Dorocak, Is the Constitution Only Libertarian and Not Socially Conservative? U.S. v.
Windsor and the Constitutionality of DOMA’s Definition of Marriage to Exclude Same-Sex
Couples–Requiem for a Heavyweight? 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 263 (2014).
10
John R. Dorocak, Why is Obamacare Constitutional While DOMA Was Not? How Libertarian
is the Constitution?, 14 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 1 (2014).
11
Id. at 22-27; Maximilian Held, Go Forth and Sin [Tax] No More: Important Tax Provisions,
and Their Hazards, in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 44 Gonz. L. Rev. 717,
731-732 (2011) (cited in Timothy Sandefur, So It’s a Tax, Now What?: Some of the Problems
Remaining after NFIB v. Sebelius, 17 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 203, n.145 (2013) (“attempting to
catalogue the PPACA tax and concluding that ‘such an anomalous example of taxation cannot be
found in any Supreme Court decision.’”)). See also Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Taxing Power
After Sebelius, 5 Wake F. L. Rev. 941 (2016).

Tax Constitutional Questions in Obamacare Continued

PART I. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC AND SPEISER V. RANDALL–
CONDITIONING A (TAX) BENEFIT ON THE NONEXERCISE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
In Citizens United v. FEC, not only did Justice Kennedy decide that
corporations and labor unions had First Amendment Free Speech rights, thus
laying the foundation for super PACs, he also employed, some might say
resuscitated, the Constitutional Conditions Doctrine.12 That doctrine states
that a benefit, including a tax benefit, cannot be conditioned on the nonexercise of a constitutional right.13 Justice Stewart stated in Perry v.
Sinderman that allowing a benefit to be conditioned on the nonexercise of a
constitutional right “would allow the government to ‘produce a result which
[it] could not command directly.’”14
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy stated that the benefit of the
corporate form of organization could not be conditioned on a corporation’s
forfeiting its First Amendment Free Speech right to speak in political
elections by making unlimited third-party expenditures, but not unlimited
contributions, to candidates.15 Justice Kennedy cited to Justice Scalia’s
dissent in another case, Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, but stopped
literally just short of citing Justice Scalia’s citation to another case, Speiser
v. Randall.16
In Speiser v. Randall, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a California
property tax exemption could not be conditioned on a veteran’s requirement
to swear a loyalty oath, when the oath would violate free speech.17 Yes,
taxation again involved in an important constitutional case. I had familiarity
in my research with Speiser and Citizens United because of another article,
which Professor Lloyd Peake and I had published in North Carolina First
Amendment Law Review, on the political activities of tax-exempt churches
in light of Citizens United.18

12

558 U.S. 310 (2010); See, e.g., Dorocak, supra note 5, at n.49–50 and accompanying text;
Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Engagement with the Affordable Care Act: Why Rationale Basis
Analysis Falls Short, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 931, 933–34 (2012) (lamenting the decline of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Samuel C. Salganik, Note, What the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine Can Teach Us About ERISA Preemption: Is It Possible to Consistently
Identify “Coercive” Pay-or-Play Schemes?, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1482 (2009) (citing much of the
existing scholarship).
13
See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
14
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
15
558 U.S. 310, 346 (2010).
16
Id. at 346.
17
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
18
John R. Dorocak, Lloyd E. Peake, Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Churches, Particularly After
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and California’s Proposition 8 Ban On Same-Sex
Marriage: Render Under Caesar What is Caesar’s, 9 First Amend. L. Rev. 448 (2011).
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In attempting an argument that Obamacare was unconstitutional, I
was interested in using Speiser v. Randall and Citizens United.19 The question
that arises, despite a possible gut reaction of unconstitutionality is, upon the
non-exercise of what constitutional right would the benefit of no Obamacare
tax be conditioned?20 In a eureka or aha! moment, it occurred to me that
liberty might be that constitutional right.21 I had approached the
constitutional condition analysis, I believe, as a traditional scholar, not an
ideologue, as may be obvious from my movement from the Free Speech
article on Citizens United.22 True, I had vague awareness as a tax professor
that some scholars were fashioning arguments based on liberty or liberty
rights found in the Constitution, or even in the Declaration of
Independence,23 from such various sources as the Preamble,24 the Ninth
Amendment,25 the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteen
Amendments,26 and the Equal Protection Clause.27 Although Justice Scalia,
in his dissent in NFIB v. Sebelius, mentioned private conduct, he relied more
explicitly on the list of the enumerated powers of the federal government and
the reservation of power to the states by the Tenth Amendment.28 What may

19

Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Dorocak, supra note 7, at nn.60-67 and accompanying text.
21
Id. at nn.63—67 and accompanying text.
22
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
23
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[T]hat all men . . . are endowed, by their
Creator, with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness . . . .”).
24
U.S. Const. Pmbl. ([S]ecure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and Posterity . . . .”).
25
U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
26
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (Justice Kennedy writing for the
majority states “[C]ongress . . . cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndividual decisions . . .
concerning intimacies of their physical relationship . . . are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
27
Randy E. Barnett, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: The Presumption of
Liberty and the Public Interest: Medical Marijuana and Fundamental Rights, 22 Wash. U. J.L. &
Pol’y. 29, 31 (2006) (“The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
contains within it the prohibition against denying any person the equal protection of the laws . . . .
[T]he equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment right all the
more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”).
28
567 U.S. 519, 647, 655 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
What is absolutely clear, affirmed by the text of the 1789 Constitution, by the
Tenth Amendment ratified in 1791, and by innumerable cases of hours in the
220 years since, is that there are structural limits upon federal power–upon
what it can prescribe with respect to private conduct, and upon what it can
impose upon the sovereign States. Whatever may be the conceptual limits of
the Commerce Clause and upon the power to tax and spend, they cannot be as
such will enable the Federal Government to regulate all private conduct and
to compel the State’s to function as administrators of federal programs.
20
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have informed my insight concerning liberty as the burdened constitutional
right, as I documented in the New Hampshire Law Review, was an overnight
Revolutionary War re-enactment outing I attended at the insistence of my
then fifth-grade son. In Southern California at an establishment named
Riley’s Farm, the evening meal was held in a Revolutionary War era pub and
featured the patriarch of the family farm delivering, as Patrick Henry, the
famous “Give me liberty or give me death” speech.29
PART II. LIBERTY AND SUPREME COURT CASES – LAWRENCE V. TEXAS,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY,
GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR, AND OBERGEFELL
V. HODGES
Are there Supreme Court cases offering precedents for the finding of
such liberty or liberty rights? Even before United States v. Windsor, when
Justice Kennedy’s revisited his analysis in Lawrence v. Texas, there was
Lawrence, and particularly Griswold v. Connecticut and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, all of which offered language and
analysis which might be used to find liberty or a liberty right could not be
violated.30
(1)
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held
a Texas statute, prohibiting same-sex, sodomy unconstitutional because it

....
The Government was invited, at oral argument, to suggest what federal
controls over private conduct (other than those explicitly prohibited by the Bill
of Rights or other constitutional controls) could not be justified as necessary
and proper for carrying out a general regulatory scheme. It was unable to name
any. . . .
; U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).;
Dorocak, supra, note 7, at n.67 and accompanying text. (citing Brad Joondeph, et al., Our Pending
National Debate: Is Healthcare Reform Constitutional?, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 605, 617 (2011)
(Professor Randy Barnett had suggested that the limited powers argument could more easily find a
receptive audience, particularly on the Court, stating, “I think there may be five votes for the
proposition that economic mandates are simply not within the limited and enumerated powers of
Congress.”).
29
See, id. at n. 113 and accompanying text. Riley’s Farm in Oak Glen, California,
www.rileysfarm.com. See, William Wirt Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry 94
(1817) (quoting Patrick Henry, Speech at the House of Burgesses at St. John’s Church in
Richmond, Virginia (Mar. 23, 1775) (transcript available at
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Patrick_Henry)).
30
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
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violated liberty.31 Justice Kennedy quoted from Justice Stevens’s dissent in
the predecessor case, Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld a similar
statute.32 Justice Stevens stated in part, “[I]ndividual decisions . . . concerning
the intimacies of their physical relationship . . . are a form of ‘liberty’
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 33
Justice Kennedy also wrote in his introductory language in Lawrence,
“Liberty protects a person from unwarranted government intrusion . . . liberty
presumes an autonomy of self . . . The instant case involves liberty . . . .”34
(2)
Justice Kennedy also quoted from Casey in Lawrence,
“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”35
Certainly, medical and medical insurance decisions, including
whether to purchase medical insurance or not, are among these most intimate
personal choices central to liberty.
Professor Barnett has written of Casey “[I]n a portion of the joint
opinion commonly attributed to Justice Kennedy, the Court shifted the focus
from privacy to liberty and even relied on the Ninth Amendment to do so.”36
It appears that Professor Barnett is concluding that there is reliance on the
Ninth Amendment, which he has favored in his research,37 although Casey
apparently only obliquely refers to that amendment in the opinion of the
Court.”38
(3)
On the other hand, in Griswold v. Connecticut, in his
concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg cited the Ninth Amendment, and wrote,
quoting Justice Brandeis, “The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred as

31

Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
33
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
34
Id. at 562.
35
Id. at 574 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
36
Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1479, 1493 (2008) (citing Casey, 505 U.S.
at 848; and Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women from Abortions, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 20, 2007 (identifying the discussion of liberty in Casey as the “portion of the opinion usually
attributed to Justice Kennedy”)).
37
Barnett, supra note 27, at 31.
Still, I started writing about the Ninth Amendment because it always seemed
like an interesting clause, and one that appealed to me ever since I was a law
student. I figured, “well, now I had tenure, so I should be able to write about
any clause that was still literally in the Constitution, even if it was considered
to be beyond the pale by scholars.”
38
505 U.S. at 847.
32
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against the government, the right to be let alone–the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized Man.”39
(4)
In United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, the
two Supreme Court cases involving same-sex marriage, Justice Kennedy
appears to have continued his liberty or liberty rights analysis.40 This
analysis, it seems, might also be utilized to argue that Obamacare and similar
legislation is unconstitutional.
(a)
In Windsor, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority
holding unconstitutional DOMA’s definition of marriage as between a man
and a woman, stated as follows.
The power which the Constitution grants it
also restrains. And though Congress has great
authority to design laws to fit its own conception of
sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.41
Writing midway between Lawrence and Windsor, Professor Barnett
argued that a new analysis had emerged, distinct from the traditional due
process and equal protection analyses, both raised by Justice Alito in his
Windsor dissent.
In other words, Lawrence did not purport to
assess the degree to which the statutory prohibition
might have met a legitimate state purpose. Instead,
it rejected an open-ended conception of the police
power of the states and found that the particular
purpose of the statute was illegitimate or improper.
This is analogous to finding a federal statute
unconstitutional because, however effective it might
be, its purpose is not among the enumerated powers
in Article I, Section 8.42
I thought Windsor spoke most clearly to the unconstitutionality of
Obamacare just as the Windsor same-sex couple could not be forced
to marry opposite gender partners to enjoy the estate tax marital
deduction, I believe that individuals should not be forced to purchase
health insurance to avoid a tax.

39

381 U.S. 479, 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
40
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
41
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
42
Barnett, supra note 36, at 1495.
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(b)
Subsequently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, again writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy held state prohibitions on same-sex marriages
unconstitutional.
The Constitution promises liberty to all
within its reach, a liberty that includes certain
specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity. The
petitioners in these cases seek to find that liberty by
marrying someone of the same sex.
....
These considerations lead to the conclusion
that the right to marry is a fundamental right
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.43
(5)
In my most recent manuscript, to be published in the
Willamette Law Review, I argue that an attempt to revoke tax exempt status
of churches opposed to same-sex marriage could be resisted by the churches,
if the IRS ever raised such a challenge and in light of private parties likely
lacking standing.44 The churches could argue the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and liberty rights.45
I ask, why not liberty for all?
(6)
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (as well as possibly
other cases) likely shows that Obamacare might be challenged for
constitutional violations, although Hobby Lobby is based on the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act rather than the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause.46
PART III. TRADITIONAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
OF OBAMACARE

43

135 S. Ct. at 2593, 2604.
John R. Dorocak, How Might a Church’s Tax-Exempt Status (and Other Advantages) (1) Be
Revoked Procedurally for Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage and (2) Be Defended Possibly as
Free Exercise of Religion? , 53 Willamette L. Rev., No. 2 (forthcoming).
45
Id.
46
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
44
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In this forum at this time, I do not believe that I can do justice to
traditional due process and equal protection analysis, with which many are
undoubtedly familiar. However, there is an aspect of substantive due process
to which it might be illuminating to give some attention. Professor Randy
Barnett has criticized traditional due process and equal protection analysis.47
Yet, Mr. Timothy Sandefur has defended substantive due process by
returning to its possible origin in the Supreme Court case of Calder v. Bull.48
Mr. Daniel J. Crooks, III, has written, “[W]indsor is best understood
as a Lawrence-brand “liberty” case distinct from the Court’s traditional equal
protection and due process precedents.”49 Mr. Crooks has also written, “The
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence is esoteric and yet equally
incomprehensible to even the keenest minds in the legal academy.”50
As I review in my article in Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal,
Justice Alito dissenting in Windsor summarized the traditional jurisprudence
of substantive due process and equal protection and the three tiers of scrutiny
of equal protection (and possibly the two tiers of scrutiny of substantive due
process).51
Mr. Timothy Sandefur has argued, based at least partly on Calder v.
Bull, concerning substantive due process, “[T]he Constitution imposes
implicit limits on the laws the legislature can enact, and the content of those
limits can be understood only by considering what the Constitution was
written to accomplish and what government may not justly do . . . .”52 Mr.
Sandefur quotes from Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v. Bull, “There are
certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will
determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power
. . . to take away that security for personal liberty . . . for the protection
whereof the government was established.”53
Mr. Sandefur has written elsewhere, when describing the contrast
between liberal and conservative originalists, “Understanding the
Constitution requires reference to more permanent principles than mere longstanding social convention.”54

47

Barnett, supra note 36.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the
Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y., 283 (2012).
49
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, (2003); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013);
Daniel J. Crooks, III, Toward “Liberty”: How the Marriage of Substantive Due Process and
Equal Protection in Lawrence and Windsor Sets the Stage for the Inevitable Loving of Our Time,
8 Charleston L. Rev. 223, 226 (2014).
50
Crooks, supra note 49, at 229.
51
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Dorocak, supra note 10, at 14.
52
Sandefur, supra note 48, at 321.
53
Id. at 321 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)).
54
Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y.
489, 497 (2004).
48
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The reference to more permanent principles by Mr. Sandefur, and
not tradition, may echo for some, what Professor Randy Barnett has called a
difference between original meaning and original intent, respectively.55
Professor Barnett has written elsewhere, “Lawrence did not purport to assess
the degree to which the statutory prohibition might have met a legitimate
state purpose. . . . This is analogous to finding a federal statute
unconstitutional because, however effective it might be, its purpose is not
among the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8.”56
CONCLUSION
When I began this journey in the summer of 2012, trying to
understand the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed by Obamacare,
I did not really know where my inquiry might lead. As others in the tax field,
I began with the thought in mind that the supposed “tax” imposed by
Obamacare did not look like other taxes.57 Mainly from a tax perspective, I
thought that the Supreme Court would hold Obamacare unconstitutional on
some ground. Then, I thought Governor Romney might deny President
Obama a second term and the implementation of Obamacare.
Justice Scalia said in the dissent in NFIB v. Sebelius: (1) that the
federal government could provide a tax credit for purchasing health insurance
but not a tax for not purchasing such insurance and (2) that, if Justice
Ginsberg were correct, the federal government was a government of
problem-solving powers not limited or enumerated powers.58 Chief Justice
Roberts wrote in the majority opinion that, yes, the federal government could
impose a tax for failure to install energy-efficient windows.59
With Republicans on their way to repeal and replace Obamacare with
apparently little concern for a constitutional basis for national healthcare, this
may be one of a few lone voices in the wilderness. Still, Republicans’ initial
repeal and replacement of Obamacare, The American Health Care Act, does
offer essentially the repeal of the individual mandate, by removing the tax
for failure to purchase health insurance, and a premium surcharge on an
individual for entering the health insurance market later (presumably when
more in need of health insurance).60 The latter is a feature Justice Scalia

55

Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 620-630 (1999).
Barnett, supra note 36, at 1495.
57
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echoed in his NFIB dissent.61 The thought is that the Founders would have
believed that Justice Scalia in this instance was closer to their original
meaning.62 We’ll leave the discussion of original meaning and original intent
to others for now and until other days.63
Thank you for your attention and this opportunity to present my
views. Of course, the issue here is broader than the Obamacare context.
Essentially, there is the conundrum posed by Benjamin Franklin, do U.S.
citizens want big government’s promise of security or do they want liberty?64
NFIB does not exist in a vacuum.65 In the same time frame it was being
decided, the Supreme Court also decided Citizens United, Windsor,
Obergefell, and other cases.66 I have come to believe that it can be argued
Obamacare and DOMA could make ordinary pragmatic Americans more
self-conscious of liberty, if we could only move past the security issue, and
thus, I have been attempting to reach a wider audience with this message.67
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss a topic, liberty, which has
become quite dear to me lately and maybe not surprisingly.
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